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URING the Survey period, Texas courts had occasion to rule on
the procedural prerequisites to bring land-use suits against governmental entities. Unless a valid claim is brought and a final
determination has been reached by the governmental entity, an inverse
condemnation suit will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I.

INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Sovereign immunity issues are often subject to pleas to the jurisdiction.
The Texas Supreme Court has held numerous times over the years that
sovereign immunity has been waived for inverse condemnation causes of
action. In 1941, the Texas Supreme Court first stated that sovereign immunity is waived in inverse condemnation causes of action under the
Texas Constitution.'
A.

INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM WAIVES IMMUNITY

While governmental entities generally are entitled to immunity from
suit and/or damages, they are not immune from damage claims brought
under article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. 2 However, these
inverse condemnation claims must be valid.
* B.B.A. Austin College, M.P.A., J.D., University of Texas; Shareholder, Winstead
P.C., Dallas, Texas. Tommy Mann and Seth McNew assisted with the writing of the article.
1. State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 735-36 (Tex. 1941).
2. See id. at 736.
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In City of Argyle v. Pierce, the court considered governmental immunity in relation to the pleading of a valid inverse condemnation claim. 3 In
this case, Pierce, a property owner near the City of Argyle, and Clear
Channel Outdoor, Inc. entered into a lease allowing Clear Channel to
build an off-premise outdoor advertising sign on Pierce's property. 4 The
City, believed that the sign was located within its extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) and was therefore in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting
"[s]igns advertising off-premise businesses, products or services." The
city stopped construction of the sign and filed complaints against Pierce
and the president of the Dallas Division of Clear Channel. 5 Pierce and
Clear Channel then filed a lawsuit in state court, claiming that the sign,
the permit for the sign, Pierce's fee interest in the land, and Clear Channel's leasehold interest were subject to inverse condemnation. 6 The City
which the trial court denied
responded by filing a plea to the jurisdiction
7
denial.
the
for
reasons
specifying
without
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the trial court's denial.
The City claimed that the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because Pierce and Clear Channel did not "show that the City's
sovereign immunity [had] been waived."'8 Governmental immunity affords a city protection from suit when the city engages in the exercise of a
governmental function unless that immunity is clearly waived; however,
article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution waives governmental immunity for valid inverse condemnation claims. 9 The court's decision, therefore, turned on whether Pierce and Clear Channel had stated a valid
inverse condemnation claim. "A compensable regulatory taking occurs
when a governmental agency imposes restrictions that either deny a property owner all economically viable use of his property or unreasonably
interfere with the owner's right to use and to enjoy the property."' 10
The court noted that the Texas Administrative Code states that "issuance of a permit shall not be deemed to create a property right in the
permittee," and, as such, the permit was not "a property interest compensable as a result of inverse condemnation."" Likewise, the court held
that Pierce and Clear Channel failed to provide evidence to support the
contention that the billboard was a fixture, thus giving rise to a property
right that should be compensated when the property is taken. 12 The
court went on to point out that neither Pierce's interest in the land nor
Clear Channel's interest in the lease supported an inverse condemnation
3. 258 S.W.3d 674, 677 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd).
4. Id. at 679.
5. Id. at 677, 679.
6. Id. at 679, 683-84.
7. Id. at 680.
8. Id. at 683.
9. See City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2004); Gen. Servs.
Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001).
10.
11.

City of Argyle, 258 S.W.3d at 683.
Id. (quoting 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.581 (2002)).

12. Id. at 684.
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claim. 13 As stated by the court, "there is no constitutional property right
to use realty in any certain way without restriction.' 1 4 Because Pierce
and Clear Channel could still use the property and the leased portion of
the property for a multitude of purposes other than an outdoor advertising sign, the court held that they had not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim of inverse condemnation. 15 The court ultimately held that
because Pierce and Clear Channel failed to state any valid inverse condemnation claim, "governmental immunity applies, and16 the trial court
should have granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction.'
In City of Dallas v. Zetterlund, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
the landowner had pled sufficient facts showing that the City had used his
property as a staging site for construction of a new water pipeline so as to
survive a plea to the jurisdiction by the City. 1 7 Zetterlund owned an undeveloped tract on Harry Hines Boulevard. 18 City contractors used his
land as a staging area without Zetterlund's consent, and he filed suit.' 9
The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction that alleged
that there was no intentional act of taking private property because its
contractors acted negligently. 20 Zetterlund produced evidence that, after
discovering the nonconsensual staging operation, he notified City employees who acknowledged the illegal use. While the City employees disputed this evidence, the court of appeals held that the evidence was
sufficient to raise a fact issue 2as1 to the City's knowledge after Zetterlund
discovered the land invasion.
In addition, the City argued that Zetterlund's claim failed because the
land invasion was not for a "public use."'22 Because the use of the property furthered the construction of a municipal pipeline, the court held
that it constituted public use.23 Further, the contractors selected this tract
because it was a more advantageous location for the staging area.2 4 As a
result, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the City's
25
plea to the jurisdiction.
With limited exceptions, governmental entities are also immune from
tort liability. Immunity was an issue in a case involving a torts and inverse condemnation suit brought by an owner of an apartment complex
against the City and Councilmember Haskin in Texas Bay Cherry Hill,
LP v. City of Fort Worth. 26 Due to a high concentration of low-income
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 685-86.
261 S.W.3d 824, 831, 834 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
Id. at 826.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 833-34.
Id. at 834.
257 S.W.3d 379, 387 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
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apartments in the Woodhaven neighborhood, the City hired a consultant
to create a Woodhaven master development plan (the Plan). The consultant proposed the redevelopment of Cherry Hill's apartments for
mixed use. While the Plan stated that the Fort Worth City Council would
not use its power of eminent domain to accomplish this goal, "the City
sued Cherry Hill to abate common and public'27nuisances under chapter
125 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code."
The parties agreed "to abate the lawsuit and cooperate ...

to reduce

criminal activity" at the project. 28 Cherry Hill then filed suit against the
City, Councilmember Haskin, and Woodhaven Community Development, Inc., alleging they conspired to diminish the apartment complex's
value for future acquisition. 29 "After a hearing, the trial court granted
30
the City's plea to the jurisdiction" and dismissed Haskin.
The City's plea to the jurisdiction claimed that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because (1) the City was immune from the "business defamation, tortious interference, and conspiracy claims," and (2) Cherry Hill's
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief causes of action were not
ripe. 3 1 Immunity from suit defeats a trial court's jurisdiction. 32 "A municipality is liable for torts arising from the exercise of its proprietary
functions, but it is generally immune from suit and liability for torts arising from

. . .

its governmental functions.

'33

The threshold question was whether the City's adoption of the Plan
was a governmental or proprietary function. 34 There are thirty-six governmental functions enumerated in the Texas Torts Claim Act. 35 The
City claimed that the "adoption of the Plan was an exercise of its planning function under section 101.0215(a)(29)." 36 Because the Plan "laid
out a program for the future redevelopment of the Woodhaven area for
the common interest," the court agreed that "the adoption of the Plan
was a governmental function. '37 Furthermore, the Plan was a community
3 8 Therefore, Cherry
development plan under section 101.0215(a)(34).
39
dismissed.
were
action
of
Hill's tort causes
Cherry Hill's amended petition sought six declarations. 40 All of the
declarations were "relate[d] to the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the City's exercise of its eminent domain powers in connection with
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 387.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 388.
Id.at 389.
Id.
Id.at 388; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a) (Vernon 2005).
Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, 257 S.W.3d at 389.
Id.at 389-90.
Id.at 390.
Id.at 393.

40. Id.
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the Plan."'4 1 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that the City had
expressly stated that it would not exercise its eminent domain powers in
furtherance of the Plan and had in fact not done so.4 2 The trial court's
refusal to review the declaratory judgment action did not present a hardship to Cherry Hill, which could assert its claim if and when the City
decided to exercise its eminent domain authority. 43 For these reasons,
Cherry Hill's declaratory 44judgment and injunction causes of action were
not ripe for adjudication.
With respect to Cherry Hill's pleadings that the "City [had] acted in
bad faith to damage Plaintiff's business and diminish the value of Plaintiff's property," the parties agreed that "governmental [entities have] no
immunity from an inverse condemnation claims [sic]." ' 4 5 A regulation is a
taking if (1) it compels the owner to suffer a physical invasion of the
owner's property, (2) it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial
use of the property, or (3) it imposes restrictions that unreasonably inter46
Cherry
fere with the owner's right to use and to enjoy the property.
47
tests.
two
first
the
meet
would
that
facts
allege
Hill did not
The factors to be considered under the third test are "(1) the economic
impact of the regulation and (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations. '48 As of the trial
date, the Plan had not been implemented. As a result, the Plan "had no
economic impact on Cherry Hill's apartments. '49 While the Texas Constitution waives immunity with respect to inverse condemnation lawsuits,
there is no statutory or constitutional waiver as to conspiracy claims to
create an inverse condemnation. Because the Plan existed only on paper,
there could be no taking and a dismissal for want of jurisdiction was
50
deemed appropriate.
B.

FAILURE TO FILE A PERMIT APPLICATION MAKES SUIT UNRIPE

Ripeness refers to the readiness of a case for litigation; a "claim is not
ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 'contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' "51 Ripeness is a
necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction. 52 The requirement
41. Id.
42.

Id. at 394.

43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 394-95.
46. Id. at 395 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 396.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Atmos Energy Corp. v. Abbott, 127 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no
pet.); see also Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.) (stating that subject matter jurisdiction may be addressed for first time on appeal, and a court
may make this inquiry on its own accord).
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that a claim be ripe for review is based on the prohibition against courts'
issuing of advisory opinions. 53 A claim is ripe if the facts involved
demonstrate that "an injury has occurred or is likely to occur."' 54 In other
words, there must be a concrete injury for the claim to be ripe. 55 A claim
is not ripe if it is based on hypothetical or contingent facts that may not
56
occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.
After the City of Dallas filed a complaint against a property owner for
demolishing a historical structure, the owner filed an inverse condemnation case that was found to be unripe.5 7 TCI owned a former railroad
depot building in the historic West End. The City revoked a demolition
permit it had issued and ordered a halt to the demolition process. De58
spite the revocation, TCI demolished the building anyway.
The City filed suit to have the building reconstructed and asked for
damages. TCI filed its inverse condemnation claim against the City and
the Texas Historical Commission (the Commission), which then filed
pleas to the jurisdiction.5 9 The trial court granted both pleas, holding that
(1) it did not have jurisdiction, (2) TCI's inverse condemnation claim was
not ripe, and (3) the conspiracy claims against the City and the Commis60
sion were barred by governmental immunity.
The Commission as a state agency possesses immunity from suit and
liability unless the immunity is waived. TCI stated in its pleadings that
the Commission had waived any immunity rights by intervening to seek
damages for destruction of a historical structure under section 315.006 of
the Texas Local Government Code. The Dallas Court of Appeals held
that the mere intervention by the Commission did not cause TCI to suffer
a physical invasion of its property, destroy all economically viable use of
the property, or otherwise result in a regulatory taking. Because TCI
could not show a valid waiver of immunity under article I, section 17 of
the Texas Constitution, the trial courts granting the Commissioner's plea
61
to the jurisdiction was upheld.
With respect to the City's ripeness claim, TCI agreed that there must
be a final determination of the application of the regulations to the property. 62 TCI argued that its takings claim had "already occurred because it
[had] lost total productive use of the area where the building once stood,
and it suffered a diminution in value when it was forced to sell an option
53. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998); see TEX.
CONST. art. II, § 1 (separation of powers); Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 164

(Tex. 2004) (noting that the separation of powers provision bars issuance of advisory
opinions).
54.
55.
56.
57.

Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442.
See Atmos Energy Corp., 127 S.W.3d at 858.
Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. 2000).
TCI W. End, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 274 S.W.3d 913, 915-17 (Tex. App.-Dallas

2009, no pet.).
58. Id. at 915.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 916.
61. Id. at 917-19.
62. Id. at 919.
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at half the alleged market value."'63 Thus, TCI argued, any future actions
64
would be futile.
The court found that the City's filing of the lawsuit to remedy TCI's
misconduct for violating a historical district ordinance and lacking a demolition permit did not constitute a taking. While the filing of the lawsuit
by the governmental entity may eventually result in a taking, the act itself
does not cause property to be "taken, damaged or destroyed for a public
use."'65 Further, on the prospect that the creation of a constructive trust
by the Commission might raise a fact-in-issue as to a taking, the court
held that it was "not in a position to review or rule on such hypothetical
66
relief."
With respect to TCI's regulatory taking claim that the City prevented it
from removing debris, the court found that TCI did not appeal the demolition permit revocation to the City's appeals board. 67 Because the City
never had the "opportunity to exercise its full discretion in considering
the plans for the building before TCI demolished it," there was no final
determination and the inverse condemnation claim was not ripe for
68
adjudication.
The El Paso Court of Appeals made a similar ruling when it held for
the governmental entity and dismissed the landowner's ruling claim based
on ripeness grounds in City of El Paso v. Maddox.69 The owner of a landlocked tract anticipated that his property would obtain public-street access through an adjoining mall site. His belief was based on a "1974 Subdivision Ordinance and City policy which required a subdivider to
'70
provide access to adjoining unplatted areas."
"In 1992, the Appellees asked the City to enforce the 1974 ordinance
against [the adjoining mall site], and the City Council instructed the City
attorney to do So.''71 However, the City then "rescinded its prior order
and amended the 1974 ordinance to eliminate the requirement for public
streets in a shopping center with internal lots." ' 72 The plaintiff's petition
alleged that the "amendment to the 1974 Subdivision Ordinance and its
retroactive application" rendered the property unusable and of no
73
value.
"[T]he City filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction because [the] claim of a regulatory taking [was] un63. Id. at 920.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 921.
68. Id.
69. City of El Paso v. Maddox, 276 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, pet.
denied).
70. Id. at 68-69.
71. Id. at 69.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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ripe."' 74 At the hearing on the plea, the parties relied on written evidence
attached to their pleadings. The City's primary argument was that, after
the ordinance was amended, the landowner plaintiffs had not submitted a
development application. 75 As a result, there had been no final decision
regarding access to the tract, particularly in light of the fact that the City
owned land adjacent to and in the vicinity of the tract which might have
allowed public-street access of some land. 76 "Following the hearing, the
court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and the City filed notice of accel'77
erated appeal."
Appellees claimed that submitting a permit application would have
been futile. Further, they argued that the City staff did not want the application to be approved. 78 The court of appeals rejected this argument
because the landowner had abandoned his original development plans
79
and had not submitted a new plan since the ordinance was amended.
Because the City did not have the opportunity to make a final determination as to a development plan or variance, the court reversed and dismissed the takings claim without prejudice. 80
The issue of ripeness in an exactions context was addressed in City of
Dallas v. Chicory Court Simpson Stuart, L.P.81 Chicory owned a tract on
which it desired to build a single-family subdivision. Representatives of
Chicory and the City met to discuss the drainage construction improvements that would be required for the project. The City took the position
that Chicory would need to build a large enough drainage system to accommodate its subdivision and the potential development of an adjoining
82
tract.
Chicory's engineers met with staff and orally proposed to divert the
flow of water but to keep the entire water course above ground. Staff
responded that Chicory's proposed drainage system would have to be
constructed below-grade. The evidence established that Chicory never
83
submitted a written plan to the City showing the above-grade option.
Subsequently, Chicory submitted a written plan showing a combination
of below- and above-grade drainage improvements. This plan would
have been less expensive than solely installing pipes underground. Chicory's engineers brought up the option of constructing a detention pond,
but the City's staff warned that it would take a significant amount of time
to review such plans. Due to time-related funding constraints, it was infeasible for Chicory to prepare plans for a potentially lengthy city
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
Dallas
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 75.
City of Dallas v. Chicory Court Simpson Stuart, L.P., 271 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.2008, pet. filed)
Id. at 415.
Id. at 418-19.
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review. 84
The last conference between the parties' engineers occurred in March
2005. Chicory's engineers testified that they orally revived their request
for an exception to the City's drainage ordinance requirements, which
was apparently denied orally by the City's representatives. 85 The parties
then exchanged e-mails, and "Chicory built the underground [system] at a
cost of $372,440.52 and dedicated it to the City."'86 Chicory's last e-mail

stated it would build the underground system but was not waiving its legal right to seek "reimbursement from the City as permitted by applica'87
ble law."
After the trial court denied its plea to the jurisdiction, the City filed an
interlocutory appeal. 88 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that Chicory's
exactions case was not ripe and reversed the trial court.8 9 While there are
occasions when an oral, as opposed to a written, denial can constitute a
final determination, in this case, Chicory was given the opportunity to
submit a written plan but failed to do so. 90
The Austin Court of Appeals found that a city employee's letter stating
that the developer's plans did not comply with relevant zoning restrictions was not a final determination in Buffalo Equities, Ltd. v. City of
Austin. 91 Buffalo Equities, Ltd. (BEL) wanted to develop its property for
mixed use and submitted a rezoning application. In addition to showing
its own property in the application, BEL included an easement it owned
on an adjacent tract, which was to be used as a driveway providing access
to the tract being recorded. A city employee wrote a letter to BEL stat92
ing that the easement could not be included in the rezoning application.
After receiving the letter, BEL asked the City's Planning and Zoning
Commission to initiate a rezoning request on the easement tract for commercial purposes to accommodate BEL's rezoning application. 93 In 2004,
BEL filed suit against the City seeking declarations that "the City's rules
and regulations [did] not prohibit the use of the driveway as part of
[BEL's mixed-use] development" and that "the owner of an easement
may file an application to rezone the easement. ' 94 In addition, "BEL
'95
brought a regulatory takings claim against the City."

The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on the grounds that the
letter constituted a "use determination" that should have been appealed
84. Id. at 419-20.
85. Id. at 421.
86. Id. at 420.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 415.
89. Id. at 424.
90. Id. at 421-22.
91. Buffalo Equities, Ltd. v. City of Austin, No. 03-05-00356-CV, 2008 WL 1990295, at
*1, *4 (Tex. App.-Austin May 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id.
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to the City's Board of Adjustment. 96 BEL argued that it was unnecessary
to exhaust administrative remedies because the City was obligated to accept the rezoning application for the easement tract. Because the declarations allegedly involved simply questions of law, there was no need to
97
exhaust remedies.
The court disagreed and found that issues on appeal would not be resolved by consideration of mere questions of law and "would involve consideration of significant factual matters. '9 8 Further, the court of appeals
found it significant that "BEL did not file an actual site-plan application." 99 Therefore, the City had "taken no position on whether it would
approve an application.' 10 0 Because BEL did not appeal the city employee's letter or file a site-plan application, its cause of action was not
°1
ripe. 1
C.

CITY COUNCIL DENIAL OF A PERMIT APPLICATION
MAKES CASE RIPE

The Dallas Court of Appeals ruled that development regulations can
be so onerous as to render a tract of land valueless in City of Sherman v.
Wayne.'0 2 Wayne purchased an old Texas National Guard army and vehicle storage building in Sherman. At the time of purchase, the property
was zoned residential, but Wayne believed the property was "grandfathered" as a nonconforming use. After Wayne became aware that the
City intended to enforce the residential zoning, which would prevent his
proposed trucking use, he filed an application to rezone the tract to industrial commercial. The Sherman City Council (the Council) denied the
10 3
application, and Wayne filed suit.
According to the City, Wayne's claim was not ripe because the denial
of only one zoning application was insufficient in light of the many available uses between the existing and requested zoning. During the rezoning
process, the City's Planning and Zoning Board (the Board) asked Wayne
to agree to numerous operational restrictions on the truck use. The court
found the applicant's willingness to comply with the numerous requested
applications to be significant. 10 4 Although the Board recommended approval, the Council unanimously denied the request with three councilmembers commenting that the tract should have a residential use.
The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to allow the City
to reach a final decision regarding the use of the property. 0 5 Wayne did
96. Id. at *2, *4.
97. Id. at *5; see Henry v. Kaufmann County Dev. Dist. No. 1, 150 S.W.3d 498, 503
(Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. granted, remanded); Jan. 28, 2005.
98. Buffalo Equities Ltd., 2008 WL 1990295, at *6.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
103. Id. at 40.
104. Id. at 41-42.
105. Id. at 42.

Zoning and Land Use

2009]

1537

not deem any of the alternative uses suggested by the City as economically viable. "Wayne was not required to re-apply numerous times ...
[for rezoning] because the City's first refusal was clear and such addi10° 6
tional efforts would have been futile.
Wayne's appraisal experts testified that the costs to develop a residential subdivision would far exceed the lot revenues. There also was no
demand for residential lots in the area. Wayne testified that the property
with residential zoning had a negative value due to maintenance costs,
taxes, and insurance.

10 7

While the City introduced two appraisal reports into evidence to show
that the tract had some value, neither assumed the property could be
used solely for residential purposes. 10 8 The reports assumed that the existing buildings could be reused and did not need to be demolished.
Wayne's burden was not "to prove beyond all possible doubt" that the
value of the property exceeded zero. 0 9 The court of appeals upheld the
trial court. 110
D.

IF AN ORDINANCE DOES NOT ALLOW VARIANCES, A CASE

Is

RIPE WITHOUT A PERMIT APPLICATION

Whether a Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) map
revision, standing alone, resulted in a taking was addressed in City of
Houston v. O'Fiel.111 The O'Fiels filed suit against the City after FEMA
approved new maps that placed their property in the floodway. They argued that the City's floodplain regulations prohibited development of
112
their property that resulted in a takings.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction stating that the O'Fiels had
never submitted a permit for a development and that the case was therefore not ripe for adjudication. In response, the O'Fiels pointed to the
City's ordinance which stated that residential development of their property was expressly forbidden and no variances or exceptions were availaI 4
ble. 11 3 The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction. 1
In this case, the Houston Code specifically prohibited development
within the floodway on the O'Fiels' tract. The court pointed out the simi115
larities to Suitum v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency.
In Suitum, the planning agency adopted rules that did not permit any
development of the land at issue. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
106. Id.
107. Id. at 44-45.
108. Id. at 46.
109. Id. at 46-47.
110. Id. at 51.
111. No. 01-08-00242-CV, 2009 WL 214350 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29,
2009, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *6.
115. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
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agency's lack of discretion to allow any development of Suitum's property
made the case ripe. 116 In O'Fiel,the City of Houston did not raise a fact
issue suggesting any variances to the regulations might be granted. As a
result, the Houston Court of Appeals held that the issue of whether the
Houston Code constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking of the
17
O'Fiels' property was ripe for adjudication.
The court of appeals pointed out that a challenge to a land-use regulation can be on its face or as applied to a particular development. 118
O'Fiels' claim was based on the theory that, regardless of how it was applied, the City's Code amounted to an unconstitutional taking. 119 Citing
the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Mayhew v. City of Sunnyvale, 20 the
court pointed out that the variance requirement is applied flexibly to allow the governmental entity to come to a final decision. 21 Thus, the
court of appeals held that, where an ordinance prohibits exceptions, it
122
would be futile to file such an application.
II.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT

A community organization brought a Texas Open Meetings Act violation in City of Austin v. Savetownlake.org.123 Savetownlake.org brought
suit against the City seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1999
recodification of the Land Development Code was void because the City
violated the Act as well as state and federal due process rights. The organization claimed that the Austin City Council agenda listed the item as
nonsubstantive changes when the City actually made substantive changes
124
to the ordinance.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing, among other things,
that Savetownlake.org lacked direct or associated standing, its claims
were not ripe, sovereign immunity barred the claims, and Savetownlake.
org's petition contained false statements in an effort to confer jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdic126
tion. 125 The City's interlocutory appeal followed.
Savetownlake.org was interested in two particular site plans. The City
argued that it revised the ordinance regarding appeal rights in 2007 and
that Savetownlake.org's claims were now moot. However, the City was
116. Id. at 744.

117. O'Fiel, 2009 WL 214350, at *6.
118. Id. at *3 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedectis, 480 U.S. 470,
494 (1987)).

119. Id.
120.
121.
122.
2006)).
123.

964 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 1998).
O'Fiel, 2009 WL 214350, at *4.
Id. at *3 (citing Hallco Tex. Inc. v. McMullen County, 221 S.W.3d 50, 60 (Tex.
No. 03-07-00410-CV, 2008 WL 3877683 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 22, 2008, no pet.)

(mem. op.).

124. Id. at *1.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *2.
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prohibited from changing its regulations after the site plan was filed.
Thus, the 2007 changes to the City's ordinance did not render
127
Savetownlake.org's complaints moot.
The trial court found that the City's arguments were actually focused
on the merits of Savetownlake.org's claims. 128 Based on the record, the
trial court properly exercised its discretion to require a "fuller develop29
ment of the case."'
1II.

ANNEXATION

The right of landowners to mount a private challenge of an annexation
ordinance was addressed in Town of Fairview v. Lawler.130 The Town of
Fairview sought to annex a portion of Lawler's property by ordinance in
2004.131 The same property was previously subject to annexation by the
Town in 1999; however, Lawler successfully challenged the annexation
under section 43.033(b) of the Texas Local Government Code. As a result, the Town was forced to disannex the property by ordinance in 2000.
Challenging the 2004 annexation of his property, Lawler filed suit alleging the 2004 annexation was unlawful because the Town was precluded
from annexing Lawler's land under section 43.141 of the Texas Local
Government Code. Section 43.141, entitled "Disannexation for Failure to
Provide Services," provides that if an "area is disannexed under this section, it may not be annexed again within ten years after the date of the
disannexation. ' 132 Alternatively, Lawler alleged that the annexation was
unlawful because "the Town's notice of the meeting to annex his property
'did not meet the notice requirements mandated by the Texas Open
33
Meetings Act.'"1
While the trial court agreed with Lawler, the Dallas Court of Appeals
did not. 134 Relying on the clear language of section 43.141, the court
found that section 43.141 was applicable only to "areas disannexed under
section 43.141.' 135 Lawler had challenged the 1999 annexation of his
property, and the property was in fact disannexed, under section 43.033,
not under section 43.141. Thus, the court held that Lawler's challenge
failed because "the ten-year limitation set forth in section 43.141(c) does
not preclude the Town's 2007 attempted annexation of Lawler's
1 36
property."'
The court also rejected Lawler's procedural challenge to the annexation of his property. Lawler's suit amounted to a private challenge of an
127. Id. at *6.
128. Id. at *4.
129. Id.
130. 252 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).

131. Id. at 855.
132. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.141(c) (Vernon 2008).
133. Town of Fairview, 252 S.W.3d at 857.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 856-57.
136. Id. at 857.
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annexation ordinance and such a challenge is permitted in only limited
circumstances. 137 The court affirmed that a quo warranto action brought
by the State is the only proper method for attacking the validity of a city's
annexation of property. 138 "In contrast, a private challenge of an annexation ordinance is proper only when the ordinance is void or the Legislature expressly grants a private right to challenge the annexation in some
manner." 139 Thus, "[tihe only proper method for challenging 'procedural
irregularities such as lack of notice, adequacy of the service plan, lack of
an anquorum for hearing, and other defects in the process of adopting
140
nexation ordinance' is a quo warranto suit by the State.
In this case, Lawler did not contend that the Legislature expressly
granted him a private right to challenge the annexation nor did he raise
an issue whether the proposed annexation by the Town would be void.
Thus, the court held that the Lawler's challenge to the Town's authority
on the Texas Open Meetings Act violations
to annex his property based
14 1
failed for lack of standing.
IV.

VESTED RIGHTS

The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered the application of the
Vested Rights Statute to a developer seeking to avoid enforcement of a
tree preservation ordinance in ContinentalHomes of Texas, L.P. v. City of
San Antonio.142 Continental Homes of Texas (Continental) was the developer of a tract of land located in the extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ)
of the city of San Antonio. 143 Prior to Continental purchasing the land
and beginning development activities, the previous owners applied for a
vested rights permit from the City. 144 The vested rights permit was
granted in March 2002 and stated that it was effective as of August 29,
1991.145 In February 2005, engineers, acting on behalf of the previous

owners of the property submitted a Master Development Plan (MDP) to
the City as well as a Master Tree Stand Delineation. 146 The City subsequently approved the MDP, but rejected the Master Tree Stand Delineation stating that "this project will be subject to the . . . 2003 Tree
Preservation ordinance .... No Tree Preservation plan is approved for
'147

this MDP.
Continental acquired the land and began development in 2006.148
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 854.
Id.
275 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. filed).
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Without applying for a tree permit, Continental began removing trees. 149
The City issued a stop work order, obtained a temporary restraining order, and subsequently filed a petition seeking a permanent injunction to
prevent the removal of trees. 150 Continental reviewed the previous
owner's files and became aware of the vested rights permit only after the
issuance of the temporary restraining order. 15' In 2006, "a jury trial was
held on the City's request for a permanent injunction, civil penalties and
mitigation damages. 1 52 Continental "pled vested rights as an affirmative
defense, asserting that it was entitled to develop the property under the
ordinances in effect on the date of vesting, i.e., August 29, 1991," and filed
a counterclaim for declaratory relief as to its vested rights, asking the
court to affirm its right to develop the property under the ordinances in
effect as of 1991.153 Since no tree ordinance was in effect in 1991, Continental asserted that it was exempt from the tree ordinance. 154 The City
argued that any vested rights had expired or become dormant and, alternatively, that even if the vested rights were valid, that Continental had to
requirements of the tree permit ordinance by
comply with the procedural 55
applying for a tree permit.
The trial court granted a permanent injunction enjoining Continental
from removing any trees from the property in question, ordering Continental to replant trees in mitigation of trees already removed, and denied
Continental's request for declaratory judgment. 156 Continental appealed. 157 On appeal, Continental challenged the trial court's judgment
in favor of the City, which was based on the affirmative defense of
waiver, arguing that waiver was neither pled by the City nor tried by consent. 158 The trial court, in Conclusion of Law No. 2, found that Continental's predecessor had administrative remedies available to it when the
City approved the MDP without a tree preservation plan. 159 Because
Continental's predecessor did not exhaust those administrative remedies,
the trial court held that any vested rights had been waived as a matter of
law. 160 The court of appeals disagreed and held that, "[b]ecause the record clearly shows that the City never pled waiver ... and the waiver
issue was not tried by consent, the trial court's judgment, which is based
'161
on waiver of Continental's vested rights, cannot stand.
Having found that Continental's vested rights were not waived, the
Court then addressed whether Continental was, nevertheless, required to
149. Id.
150.

Id.

151. Id. at 12-13.
152. Id. at 13.
153. Id.
154.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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comply with the tree permit ordinance. Citing its recent decision in City
of San Antonio v. En Seguido, Ltd., the court stated that "rights vest in a
particular project, not the land, and are not affected by a subsequent conveyance of the property."' 162 The court also cited section 245.002 of the
Texas Local Government Code, which prohibits a city from enforcing ordinances that are enacted after rights have vested.1 63 Because the tree
permit ordinance, by its own terms, regulated only those activities conducted on property "to which the division applies," and because the ordinance was not applicable to Continental's property due to the vested
rights permit, the court found that Continental was not required to comply with the tree permit ordinance. 164 Finally, the court rendered a declaratory judgment that Continental had "the vested right to develop the
[property] under the ordinances in effect as of August 29,1991, and
award[ed] Continental its attorney's fees in the amounts found by the
165
jury" in the trial court.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals, in Hardee v. City of San Antonio,
also addressed the question of when a claim of vested rights is ripe. 166 In
this case, the developers of several tracts of land filed a petition seeking
an injunction to prevent the City of San Antonio from enforcing any development ordinances against several projects and a declaration that "any
Development Ordinances . . .passed or otherwise made effective after
April 13, 1978, and/or November 9, 1983 .. .may not be applied to or
enforced against the development of the Property."' 16 7 The City, in a plea
to the jurisdiction, asserted that the developers' claims were not ripe because the City had never made a final decision regarding the application
court granted the plea to
of the ordinances to the property. 16 8 The trial
169
the jurisdiction and the developers appealed.
The Court, citing Save Our Springs Alliance v. City of Austin, noted
that before a claim of vested rights is ripe for judicial determination pursuant to chapter 245, "[a] regulatory agency ought to have the opportunity to make a final determination as to which set of land-use regulations
apply to a specific plat.' 70 In the case at hand, the developers merely
sent a letter to the City seeking verification that a particular ordinance
did not apply to four projects. 17 1 The developers' letter was not an application for a permit, and the City was not required to determine which
162. Id. (citing City of San Antonio v. En Seguido, Ltd., 227 S.W.3d 237, 242-43 (Tex.

App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.)).
163. Id. at 19 (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T
164. Id.
165. Id. at 22.

CODE ANN. § 245.002 (Vernon 2008)).

166. No. 04-07-00740-CV, 2008 WL 2116251 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 21, 2008,

no pet.) (mem. op.).
167. Id. at *1.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *2 (quoting Save Our Springs Alliance v. City of Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674, 683
(Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.)).

171. Id.
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ordinances applied.1 72 The City responded by notifying the developers
that they were required to apply for a vested rights permit so that the
City could determine which ordinances were applicable to the projects,
but the developers took no further action. 73 Finding that "[a]t the time
the Developers filed the underlying lawsuit, the City had not been given
the opportunity 'to make a final determination as to which set of land-use
regulations appl[ied]' to the project," the court held that "no claim for
declaratory or injunctive relief seeking to enforce [vested rights] was ripe
1 74
for judicial consideration.
V.

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

A city's refusal to allow nonconforming signs to be reconstructed was
addressed in Lamar Corp. v. City of Longview.1 75 Lamar owned and operated three billboards within 1,500 feet of a public park. Longview enacted an ordinance banning billboards within 1,500 feet of a public
17 6
park.
Without a permit, Lamar dismantled and then attempted to reconstruct
the billboard structures. The City sent a notice of violation insisting that
permits were needed. After receiving the permits, the City denied them
on the grounds that Lamar was not performing maintenance but was reconstructing the signs. The Board of Adjustment denied the sign com177
pany's appeal of the staff's interpretation of the sign ordinance.
Thereafter, Lamar filed a petition for declaratory relief in Gregg
County District Court to declare: 1) the work done on Lamar's billboards was normal maintenance, which did not require a permit;
2) Lamar's signs did not lose their nonconforming status; and 3) Lamar was not required to remove the signs ....
In an amended petition, Lamar also asked the trial court to declare [the ordinance]
unconstitutional as a taking of private property without just compensation if the court determined the ordinance
prevented 'maintenance
1 78
operations to the support structures.
Because Lamar did not file a writ of certiorari as required by section 211.011 of the Texas Local Government Code, the Texarkana Court
of Appeals dismissed based on lack of standing except as to the unconstitutional takings issue.' 79 Because the City's billboard ordinance was intended to keep unmaintained signs from injuring motor vehicles and
pedestrians and preserve the beautification of the City, the court of appeals held that the sign ordinance was "substantially related to the public
172. Id. at *3.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 270 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.).
176. Id. at 611-12.

177. Id. at 612.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 614.
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health, safety and welfare of the City's citizens."18 0 Because property
owners do not acquire a protected property interest in a use such as a
of appeals held that the City's sign ordinance did not
billboard, the court 181
constitute a taking.

180. Id. at 616.
181. Id. at 617.

